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The article proposes Logic of Secrets in Collaboration Networks, a formal logical system for
reasoning about a set of secrets established over a fixed configuration of communication
channels. The system’s key feature, a multi-channel relation called independence, is a
generalization of a two-channel relation known in the literature as nondeducibility. The
main result is the completeness of the proposed system with respect to a semantics of
secrets.
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1. Introduction
Suppose that several parties are connected by communication channels that form a network with a fixed topology. In
this setting, which we call a collaboration network, a pair of parties connected by a channel uses this channel to establish
a secret. If the pairs of parties establish their secrets completely independently from other pairs, then possession of one
or several of these secrets reveals no information about the other secrets. Assume, however, that the secrets are not picked
completely independently. Instead, each party with access tomultiple channels may enforce some desired interdependency
between the secrets it shares with other parties. These ‘‘local’’ interdependencies between secrets known to a single party
may result in a ‘‘global’’ interdependency between several secrets, not all of which are known to any single party. Given
the fixed topology of the collaboration network, we study what global interdependencies between secrets may exist in the
system.
Consider, for example, the collaboration network depicted in Fig. 1. Suppose that the parties collaborate according to the
following protocol. Party P picks a random value a from {0, 1} and sends it to party Q . Party Q picks values b and c from
{0, 1} in such a way that a = b + c mod 2 and sends both of these values to R. Party R computes d = b + c mod 2 and
sends value d to party S. In this protocol, it is clear that the values of a and d will always match. We view a, b, c , and d as
secrets, conditions a = b+ c mod 2 and d = b+ c mod 2 as local interdependencies, and condition a = dmod 2 as a global
interdependency.
Note that, in the above example, all channels transmit messages in one direction and, thus, the channel network forms a
directed graph. However, in the more general setting, two parties might establish the value of a secret through a dialog over
their communication channel, with messages traveling in both directions. Thus, in general, we will not assume any specific
direction on a channel.
If two or more secrets are not interdependent, then we will say that they are independent (a formal definition of
independence will be given in Definition 4). In the logical system presented in this article we use independence, not
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Fig. 1. Collaboration network N1 .
Fig. 2. [a, b] → [a, c] holds on N2 .
Fig. 3. [b, c] → ([a, e] → [a, d]) holds on N3 .
interdependence, as the basic notion simply because it produces a slightly more elegant system. Another way to define
independence is to say that secrets are independent if any values of these secrets that can occur in the protocol can also
occur simultaneously. For example, secrets a and b in the above protocol are independent, but secrets a and d are not.
Furthermore, although secrets a, b, and c in the above protocol are all pairwise independent, the three secrets considered
together are not independent.
The independence examples that we have given so far are for a single protocol, subject to a particular set of local
interdependencies between secrets. If the topology remains fixed, but the protocol is changed, then secrets which were
previously independent could become interdependent, and vice versa. In this article, however, we study the independence
of secrets that follow from the topological structure of the network of channels, no matter which specific protocol is used.
For example, it is relatively easy to see that, for collaboration networkN2 in Fig. 2, if secrets a and b are independent, then
secrets a and c are also independent, regardless of the protocol used. This is a property of the network topology, not of the
protocol.We say that [a, b] → [a, c] is true on topologyN2, where [a, b] is our notation for the independence of secrets a and
b. Another less obvious property of independence is true for collaboration network N1, which defines the network topology
in Fig. 1. Namely, if channels a, b, and c are independent, then channels a and d are independent: that is, [a, b, c] → [a, d]
is true on N1. As a final example, consider collaboration network N3 in Fig. 3, where the property [b, c] → ([a, e] → [a, d])
holds. In Section 6, we will prove each of these claims.
In this article, we present a logic that describes the independence properties of any network topology. The deductive
system for this logic operates with binary relation N ⊢ φ, where N is a collaboration network that specifies a network
topology, and φ is a propositional statement about secret independence. Our main results are the soundness (see
Theorems 5–7) and completeness (see Theorem 8) of this deductive systemwith respect to the intended protocol semantics.
It is interesting to note that one of the inference rules of this deductive systemmodifies not only a formulaφ, but the network
N as well. The formulas in this logic capture properties of a fixed topology, but the logic itself modifies the topology as part
of a derivation. This makes our formal system very different from the traditional deductive systems in mathematical logic.
Our work is related to the study of information flow. Most of the literature in this area, however, studies information
flow from the language-based [8,1] or probabilistic [4,5] points of view. Historically ([6], page 185), one of the first
attempts to capture independence in our sense was undertaken by Goguen and Meseguer [3] through their notion of
noninterference between two computing devices. Later, Sutherland [9] introduced a no information flow relation, which is
essentially our independence relation restricted to two-element sets. This relation has since become known in the literature
as nondeducibility. Cohen [2] presented a related notion called strong dependence. Unlike nondeducibility, however, the
strong dependence relation is not symmetric. More recently, Halpern and O’Neill [4,5] introduced f -secrecy to reason about
multiparty protocols. The f -secrecy predicate is a version of nondeducibility that can refer to a value of a certain function of
the secret rather than the secret itself. However, all of these works focus on the application of the independence relation in
the analysis of secure protocols, whereas the main focus of our work is on logical properties of the relation itself. This article
is a significant revision of an earlier conference paper [7].
2. Protocol: a formal definition
Throughout this article, we assume a fixed infinite alphabet of variables a, b, . . ., which we refer to as ‘‘secret variables’’.
By a network topology we mean a collaboration network whose edges, or ‘‘channels’’, are labeled by secret variables. We
allow multiple edges and loops. The set of all channels of collaboration network N will be denoted by Ch(N). One channel
may have several labels, but the same label can be assigned to only one channel. Given this, we will often informally refer
to ‘‘the channel labeled with a’’ as simply ‘‘channel a’’.
Definition 1. A semi-protocol over a collaboration network N is a pair ⟨V , L⟩ such that the following hold.
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Fig. 4. Graph truncation.
1. V (c) is an arbitrary set of ‘‘values’’ for each channel c ∈ Ch(N).
2. L = {Lp}p∈P is a family of predicates, indexed by parties of N , which we call ‘‘local conditions’’. If c1, . . . , ck is the list of
all channels incident with party p, then Lp is a predicate on V (c1)× · · · × V (ck).
Definition 2. A run of a semi-protocol ⟨V , L⟩ is a function r such that the following hold.
1. r(c) ∈ V (c) for any channel c ∈ Ch(N).
2. If c1, . . . , ck is the list of all secrets incident with party p ∈ P , then predicate Lp(r(c1), . . . , r(ck)) is true.
Definition 3. A protocol is any semi-protocol that has at least one run.
The set of all runs of a protocol P is denoted byR(P ). We conclude this section with the key definition of this article. It is
a multi-argument version of Sutherland’s binary nondeducibility predicate that we call independence.
Definition 4. A set of channels Q = {q1, . . . , qk} is called independent under protocol P if for any runs r1, . . . , rk ∈ R(P )
there is a run r ∈ R(P ) such that r(qi) = ri(qi) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Definition 5. A protocol P = ⟨V , L⟩ is called finite if the set V (c) is finite for every c ∈ Ch(N).
3. Language of secrets
Informally, byΦ(N), we denote the set of all properties of secrets in collaboration networkN . Formally,Φ(N) is aminimal
set defined recursively as follows: (i) for any finite set of secret variables {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ Ch(N), formula [a1, . . . , an] belongs
to set Φ(N), (ii) the false constant⊥ belongs to Φ(N), and (iii) for any formulas φ and ψ ∈ Φ(N), the implication φ → ψ
also belongs toΦ(N). As usual, we assume that conjunction, disjunction, and negation are defined through→ and⊥.
Next, we define relation P  φ. Informally, this means that formula φ is true under protocol P .
Definition 6. For any protocolP over a collaboration network N , and any formula φ ∈ Φ(N), we define the relationP  φ
recursively as follows.
1. P 2 ⊥.
2. P  [a1, . . . , an] if the set of channels {a1, . . . , an} is independent under protocol P .
3. P  φ1 → φ2 if P 2 φ1 or P  φ2.
In this article, we study the set of formulas that are true under any protocol P as long as collaboration network N remains
fixed. The set of all such formulas will be captured by the Logic of Secrets in Collaboration Networks. Below, wewill list axioms
and inference rules for this logic, and prove their soundness and completeness.
4. Graph notation
In preparation for the presentation of an inference rule used in our system, we introduce a graph operation called
truncation. As usual, a cut of a graph is a disjoint partitioning of the nodes of the graph into two sets. A crossing edge in
a cut is an edge whose ends belong to different sets of the partition. For any set of nodes X of a graph N we use E(X) to
denote the set of edges of N whose ends both belong to X .
Definition 7. Let N be an arbitrary graph, and let (X, Y ) be an arbitrary cut of N (see Fig. 4). We define the ‘‘truncation’’
graph NX of graph N as follows.
1. The nodes of graph NX are the nodes of set X .
2. The edges of NX are all of the edges from E(X) plus the crossing edges of the cut (X, Y )modified in the following way: if,
in graph N , a crossing edge c connects node n ∈ X with nodem ∈ Y , then, in graph NX , edge c loops from n back into n.
Each edge e in NX corresponds to a unique edge in N . Although the two corresponding edges might connect different
nodes in their respective graphs, we will refer to both of them as edge e. From the context, it will be clear to which of the
two edges we are referring.
To close this section, we define the concept of a gateway between two sets of edges in a graph, which is used in an axiom
introduced in the following section.
962 S. Miner More, P. Naumov / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 162 (2011) 959–969
Fig. 5. Collaboration network N ′3 (shown) is a truncation of N3 from Fig. 3.
Definition 8. A gateway between sets of edges A and B in a graph N is a set of edges G such that every path from A to B
contains at least one edge from G.
Note that sets A, B, and G are not necessarily disjoint. Thus, for example, for any set of edges A, set A is a gateway between A
and itself. Also, note that the empty set is a gateway between any two components of the graph that are not connected to
each other.
5. Formal system: axioms and rules
We are now ready to describe the Logic of Secrets in Collaboration Networks. We will write N ⊢ φ to state that formula
φ ∈ Φ(N) is provable in this logic. Everywhere below, X, Y means the union of sets X and Y . The deductive system for this
logic, in addition to propositional tautologies andModus Ponens inference rule, consists of the Small Set axiom, the Gateway
axiom, and the Truncation inference rule, defined below.
Small Set axiom. Any set that contains less than two elements is independent: N ⊢ [A], where A ⊆ Ch(N) and |A| < 2.
Gateway axiom. N ⊢ [A,G] → ([B] → [A, B]), where G is a gateway between sets of channels A and B in collaboration
network N such that A ∩ G = ∅.
Truncation rule. Let C ⊆ Ch(N) be the set of all crossing channels of a cut (X, Y ) of collaboration network N , and let
φ ∈ Φ(NX ). If NX ⊢ φ, then N ⊢ [C] → φ.
The soundness of this system will be demonstrated in Section 7.
6. Examples of proofs
In this section we provide examples of proofs in the Logic of Secrets in Collaboration Networks.
Theorem 1. N2 ⊢ [a, b] → [a, c], where N2 is shown in Fig. 2.
Proof. Note that the single-element set {b} is a gateway between sets {a} and {c}. Thus, by theGateway axiom,N2 ⊢ [a, b] →
([c] → [a, c]). By the Small Set axiom, N2 ⊢ [c]. Therefore, N2 ⊢ [a, b] → [a, c]. 
Theorem 2. N1 ⊢ [a, b, c] → [a, d], where N1 is shown in Fig. 1.
Proof. Note that set {b, c} is a gateway between sets {a} and {d}. Thus, by the Gateway axiom, N1 ⊢ [a, b, c] → ([d] →
[a, d]). By the Small Set axiom, N1 ⊢ [d]. Therefore, N1 ⊢ [a, b, c] → [a, d]. 
Theorem 3. N3 ⊢ [b, c] → ([a, e] → [a, d]), where N3 is shown in Fig. 3.
Proof. The cut ({P,Q , S, T }, {R}) of collaboration network N3 has crossing edges b and c. A truncation along this cut yields
collaboration network N ′3 (see Fig. 5). In N
′
3, set {e} is a gateway between sets {a} and {d}. Thus, by the Gateway axiom, we
have N ′3 ⊢ [a, e] → ([d] → [a, d]). By the Small Set axiom, N ′3 ⊢ [a, e] → [a, d]. Lastly, by the Truncation inference rule, we
conclude that N3 ⊢ [b, c] → ([a, e] → [a, d]). 
Finally, we present a general result to which we will refer during the proof of completeness in Theorem 8.
Theorem 4 (Monotonicity). N ⊢ [A] → [B], for any collaboration network N and any sets A and B such that B ⊆ A ⊆ Ch(N).
Proof. Consider sets B and∅. Since there are no paths connecting these sets, any set of channels is a gateway between these
sets. In particular, (A \ B) is such a gateway. Taking into account that sets B and (A \ B) are disjoint, by the Gateway axiom,
N ⊢ [B, (A \B)] → ([∅] → [B]). By the Small Set axiom, N ⊢ [B, (A \B)] → [B]. By the assumption that B ⊆ A, we conclude
that N ⊢ [A] → [B]. 
7. Soundness
The proof of soundness, particularly the soundness of the Gateway axiom and the Truncation rule, is nontrivial. For each
axiom and inference rule, we provide its justification as a separate theorem.
Theorem 5 (Small Set). For any collaboration network N, if P is an arbitrary protocol over N and any A ⊆ Ch(N) has at most
one element, then P  [A].
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Proof. If A = ∅, then P  [A] follows from the existence of at least one run of any protocol. If A = {a1}, consider any run
r1 ∈ R(P ). Pick r to be r1. This guarantees that r(a1) = r1(a1). 
Theorem 6 (Gateway). For any collaboration network N = ⟨V , E⟩, and any gateway G between sets of channels A and B in N, if
P  [A,G], P  [B], and A ∩ G = ∅, then P  [A, B].
Proof. Assume thatP  [A,G],P  [B], andA∩G = ∅. LetA = {a1, . . . , an} and B = {b1, . . . , bk}. Consider any r1, . . . , rn+k.
It will be sufficient to show that there is a run r ∈ R(P ) such that r(ai) = ri(ai) for any i ≤ n and r(bi) = rn+i(bi) for any
i ≤ k. By the assumption that P  [B], there is a run rB ∈ R(P ) such that
rB(bi) = rn+i(bi) for every i ≤ k. (1)
By the assumptions that P  [A,G] and A ∩ G = ∅, there must be a run rA such that
rA(c) =

ri(c) if c = ai for i ≤ n,
rB(c) if c ∈ G. (2)
Next, consider collaboration network N ′ obtained from N by the removal of all channels in G. By the definition of a gateway,
no single connected component of network N ′ can contain both a channel from set A and a channel from set (B \ G). Let us
divide all connected components of N ′ into two subgraphs N ′A and N
′
B such that N
′
A contains no channels from (B \ G) and N ′B
contains no channels from A. Components that do not contain channels from either A or (B \ G) can be arbitrarily assigned
to either N ′A or N
′
B.
By Eq. (2), runs rA and rB on N agree on each channel of gateway G. We will now construct a combined run r by ‘‘sewing
together’’ portions of rA and rB with the ‘‘stitches’’ placed along gateway G. Formally,
r(c) =
rA(c) if c ∈ N ′A,
rA(c) = rB(c) if c ∈ G,
rB(c) if c ∈ N ′B.
(3)
Let us first prove that r is a valid run of the protocol P . For this, we need to prove that it satisfies local conditions Lp at
every party p. Without loss of generality, assume that p ∈ N ′A. Hence, on all channels incident with p, run r agrees with run
rA. Thus, run r satisfies Lp simply because rA does.
Next, we will show that r(ai) = ri(ai) for any i ≤ n. Indeed, by Eqs. (2) and (3), r(ai) = rA(ai) = ri(ai). Finally, we will
need to show that r(bi) = rn+i(bi) for any i ≤ k. This, however, follows easily from Eqs. (1) and (3). 
Theorem 7 (Truncation). Assume that (X, Y ) is a cut of collaboration network N, set C is the set of all crossing channels of this
cut, and φ is a formula in Φ(NX ). If P ′  φ for every protocol P ′ over truncation NX , then P  [C] → φ for every protocol P
over network N.
Proof. Suppose that there is a protocol P over N such that P  [C], but P 2 φ. We will construct a protocol P ′ over NX
such that P ′ 2 φ.
Let P = ⟨V , L⟩. Note that, for any channel e, not all values from V (e) may actually be used in the runs of this protocol.
Some values might be excluded by the particular local conditions of P . To construct protocol P ′ = ⟨V ′, L′⟩ over truncation
NX , for any channel e of NX we first define V ′(e) as the set of values that are actually used by at least one run of protocol P :
V ′(e) = {r(e) | r ∈ R(P )}.
The local condition L′p at any party p of truncation NX is the same as under protocolP . To show that protocolP ′ has at least
one run, notice that the restriction of any run of P to channels in NX constitutes a valid run of P ′.
Lemma 1. For any run r ′ ∈ R(P ′) there is a run r ∈ R(P ) such that r(e) = r ′(e) for each channel e in truncation NX .
Proof. Consider any run r ′ ∈ R(P ′). By the definition ofV ′, for any e in cut C there is a run re ∈ R(P ) such that r ′(e) = re(e).
Since P  [C], there is a run rY ∈ R(P ) such that rY (e) = re(e) = r ′(e) for any e ∈ C .
We will now construct a combined run r ∈ R(P ) by ‘‘sewing together’’ rY and r ′ with the ‘‘stitches’’ placed in set C .
Recall that we use the notation E(X) to denote channels whose ends are both in set X . Formally, let
r(e) =
r ′(e) if e ∈ E(X),
r ′(e) = rY (e) if e ∈ C,
rY (e) if e ∈ E(Y ).
We just need to show that r satisfies Lp at every party p of collaboration network N . Indeed, if p ∈ Y , then run r is equal to
rY on all channels incident with p. Thus, it satisfies the local condition because run rY does. Alternatively, if p ∈ X , then run
r is equal to run r ′ on all channels incident with p. Since r ′ satisfies local condition L′p and, by definition, L′p ≡ Lp, we can
conclude that r again satisfies condition Lp. 
Lemma 2. For any set of channels Q = {q1, . . . , qn} in collaboration network NX ,
P  [Q ] iff P ′  [Q ].
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Proof. Assume first that P  [Q ], and consider any runs r ′1, . . . , r ′n ∈ R(P ′). We will construct a run r ′ ∈ R(P ′) such that
r ′(qi) = r ′i (qi) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Indeed, by Lemma 1, there are runs r1, . . . , rn ∈ R(P ) that match runs r ′1, . . . , r ′n
on all channels in NX . By the assumption that P  [Q ], there must be a run r ∈ R(P ) such that r(qi) = ri(qi) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, r(qi) = ri(qi) = r ′i (qi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Let r ′ be the restriction of run r to the channels in NX .
Since the local conditions of protocolsP andP ′ are the same, r ′ ∈ R(P ′). Finally, we notice that r ′(qi) = r(qi) = r ′i (qi) for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Next, assume that P ′  [Q ], and consider any runs r1, . . . , rn ∈ R(P ). We will show that there is a run r ∈ R(P ) such
that r(qi) = ri(qi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Indeed, let r ′1, . . . , r ′n be the restrictions of runs r1, . . . , rn to the channels in NX .
Since the local conditions of these two protocols are the same, r ′1, . . . , r ′n ∈ R(P ′). By the assumption thatP ′  [Q ], there is
a run r ′ ∈ R(P ′) such that r ′(qi) = r ′i (qi) = ri(qi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By Lemma 1, there is a run r ∈ R(P ) that matches
r ′ everywhere in NX . Therefore, r(qi) = r ′(qi) = ri(qi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. 
Lemma 3. For any formula ψ ∈ Φ(NX ), P  ψ if and only if P ′  ψ .
Proof. We use induction on the complexity ofψ . The base case follows from Lemma 2, and the induction step is trivial. 
The statement of Theorem 7 immediately follows from Lemma 3. 
8. Completeness
Our main result is the following completeness theorem for the Logic of Secrets in Collaboration Networks.
Theorem 8. For any collaboration network N, if P  φ for all finite protocols P over N, then N ⊢ φ.
At the core of the proof is the construction of a finite protocol. This protocol will be formed as a composition of several
simpler protocols, where each of the simpler protocols is defined recursively. The base case of this recursive definition is the
parity protocol defined below.
8.1. Parity protocol
Let N be a collaboration network, and let A be a subset of Ch(N). We define the ‘‘parity protocol’’ PA over N as follows.
The set of values of any channel c in collaboration network N is a set of pairs such that
V (c) =
{⟨b1, b2⟩ | b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}} if c ∈ A
{⟨b, b⟩ | b ∈ {0, 1}} if c /∈ A.
This means that, under each run r ∈ PA, the value of each channel will be a pair. We identify each of the components of
such a pair with one of the two ends of the channel. If channel c connects party p with party q and r is a run, then by the
projection prp(r(c))wemean the component of the pair associated with p, and by prq(r(c)) the component associated with
q. Now we are ready to specify the local condition predicates Lp. If c1, . . . , cn is the list of all channels incident with p, then
Lp is the statement
prp(r(c1))+ · · · prp(r(cn)) = 0 mod 2.
This concludes the definition of the parity protocol PA.
Theorem 9. PA is a finite protocol.
Proof. We need to prove the existence of a run that satisfies all local conditions. Indeed, consider the run r0 such that
r0(c) = ⟨0, 0⟩ for any channel c. 
Definition 9. For any run r , if r(c) = ⟨b1, b2⟩, let⊕(r(c)) denote b1 + b2 mod 2.
Theorem 10. For any run r of the parity protocol PA,−
c∈A
⊕(r(c)) = 0 mod 2.
Proof. Let P be the set of all parties in collaboration network N . If we let Inc(p) denote the set of all channels incident with
party p, then−
c∈A
⊕(r(c)) =
−
c∈Ch(N)
⊕(r(c))−
−
c /∈A
⊕(r(c))
=
−
p∈P
−
c∈Inc(p)
prp(r(c))−
−
c /∈A
0 =
−
p∈P
0− 0 = 0 mod 2. 
Definition 10. Assume that π is a path in network N such that either
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1. π = a, c1, c2, . . . , cn, b is a simple path, where a, b ∈ A and a ≠ b, or
2. π = c1, c2, . . . , cn, c1 is a simple cyclic path.
For any run r of the parity protocol PA and path π in N , we introduce a function called flip(r, π) that assigns a value from
V (c) to each channel c of N as follows. For any x ∈ Ch(N), let r(x) = ⟨x1, x2⟩, and define
flip(r, π)(x) =

⟨x1,¬x2⟩ if x = a,
⟨¬x1,¬x⟩ if x ∈ {c1, . . . , cn},
⟨¬x1, x2⟩ if x = b,
⟨x1, x2⟩ if x ∉ π .
Theorem 11. flip(r, π) ∈ R(PA) for any r ∈ PA and path π in N.
Proof. The flip operation preserves the local conditions of protocol PA. 
Theorem 12. If |A| > 1 and collaboration network N is connected, then, for any a ∈ A and any v ∈ {0, 1}, there is a run
r ∈ R(PA) such that⊕(r(a)) = v.
Proof. By Theorem9, there is a run r of protocolPA. Suppose that⊕(r(a)) ≠ v. Since |A| > 1 and collaboration networkN is
connected, there is a simple pathπ that connects channel awith channel b ∈ A such that b ≠ a. Consider run r ′ = flip(r, π),
and notice that⊕(r ′(a)) = v. 
Theorem 13. If |A| > 1 and network N is connected, then PA 2 [A].
Proof. Let A = {a1, . . . , ak}. Pick any values v1, . . . , vk such that v1 + · · · + vk = 1 mod 2. By Theorem 12, there are runs
r1, . . . , rk ∈ R(PA) such that ⊕(ri(ai)) = vi for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. If PA  [A], then there is a run r ∈ R(PA) such that
r(ai) = ri(ai) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Therefore,⊕(r(a1))+· · ·+⊕(r(ak)) = ⊕(r1(a1))+· · ·+⊕(rk(ak)) = v1+· · ·+ vk =
1 mod 2. This contradicts Theorem 10. 
Theorem 14. Let A and B be subsets of Ch(N), and let N ′ be the collaboration network N with all channels in B removed. If each
connected component of N ′ contains at least one channel from A, then PA  [B].
Proof. Let B = {b1, . . . , bk}. Consider any runs r1, . . . , rk ∈ R(PA). We will prove that there is a run r ∈ R(PA) such that
r(bi) = ri(bi) for every v ∈ bi. Indeed, protocolPA has at least one run. Call it rˆ . We will modify run rˆ to satisfy the condition
rˆ(bi) = ri(bi) for any i ≤ k. Our modification will consist of repeating the following procedure for each i ≤ k and each end
p of channel bi such that prp(rˆ(bi)) ≠ prp(ri(bi)).
1. Suppose that bi ∈ A. Let N ′p be the connected component of collaboration network N ′ that contains party p. By the
assumption of the theorem, there must be a path π ′ in N ′p connecting party pwith a channel in (A \ B). Consider the path
in N that starts with channel bi and then follows path π ′ in N ′p.
Let f denote the run flip(rˆ, π). By Theorem 11, f ∈ R(PA). Note that prp(f (bi)) = 1 − prp(rˆ(bj)) = prp(ri(bi)), as
desired. Additionally, run f matches rˆ everywhere except path π , and π contains only a single end of one channel from
set B. Specifically, it contains end p of channel bi. Thus, it is clear that, for each end q of each channel bj other than bi,
prq(f (bj)) = prq(rˆ(bj)). Furthermore, for the end q of channel bi where q ≠ p, prq(f (bi) = prq(rˆ(bi)) as well. Let run f be
the new rˆ .
2. If bi /∈ A, then, by definition ofPA, for any run r ∈ PA, both components of pair r(bi)must be equal. At the same time, by
our assumption, prp(rˆ(bi)) ≠ prp(ri(bi)). Thus prq(rˆ(bi)) ≠ prq(ri(bi)), where q is the end of channel bi different from p.
Note that parties p and qmay belong either to the same connected component or to two different connected components
of collaboration network N ′. We will consider these two subcases separately.
(a) Suppose that p and q belong to the same connected component of N ′. Thus, there must be a path π ′ in N ′ which
connects parties p and q. Consider now a cyclic path in collaboration network N that starts at channel bi, follows path
π ′, and comes back to bi. Call this cyclic path π .
(b) Suppose that p and q belong to different connected components of N ′. Thus, by the assumption of the theorem, N ′
contains a path πp that connects party p with a channel in (A \ B). By the same assumption, N ′ must also contain
a path πq that connects party q with a channel in (A \ B). Let path π be composed by attaching paths πp and πq to
channel bi at ends p and q, respectively.
Again, let f denote the run flip(rˆ, π), which is in R(PA) by Theorem 11. Note also that f (bj) = rˆ(bj) for all j, where
j ≠ i. When j = i, the two ends of f (bj) have values which are equal to each other, but opposite that on the two equal
ends of rˆ(bj). Thus, f (bj) = ri(bi). Let f be the new rˆ .
Let r be rˆ with all the modifications described above. These modifications guarantee that r(bi) = rˆ(bi) = ri(bi) for any
i ≤ k. 
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8.2. Recursive construction
In this section, we will generalize the parity protocol through a recursive construction. First, however, we will establish
a technical result that we will need for this construction.
Theorem 15 (Protocol Extension). For any cut (X, Y ) of collaboration network N and any finite protocol P ′ on truncation NX ,
there is a finite protocol P on N such that, for any set Q ⊆ Ch(N),
P  [Q ] iff P ′  [Q ∩ E(NX )].
Proof. To define protocolP , we need to specify a set of valuesV (c) for each channel c ∈ Ch(N) and the set of local conditions
for each party p in collaboration networkN . If c ∈ Ch(NX ), then let V (c) be the same as in protocolP . Otherwise, V (c) = {ϵ},
where ϵ is an arbitrary element. The local conditions at the parties inX are the same as in protocolP ′, and the local conditions
at the parties in Y are equal to the boolean constant True. This completes the definition ofP . Clearly,P has at least one run
as long as P ′ has a run.
(⇒): Suppose that Q ∩ E(NX ) = {q1, . . . , qk}. Consider any r ′1, . . . , r ′k ∈ R(P ′). Define runs r1, . . . , rk as follows:
ri(c) =

r ′i (c) if c ∈ Ch(NX ),
ε if c /∈ Ch(NX ).
Note that runs ri and r ′i , by definition, are equal on any channel incident with any party in collaboration network NX . Thus,
ri satisfies the local conditions at any such party. Hence, ri ∈ R(P ) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. By Definition 3, there must be at
least one run of protocol P (even if k = 0). Call this run r0. By the assumption that P  [Q ], there is a run r ∈ R(P ) such
that
r(c) =

ri(c) if c = qi,
r0(c) if c ∈ Q \ E(NX ).
Define r ′ to be a restriction of r on collaboration networkNX . Note that r ′ satisfies all local conditions ofP ′. Thus, r ′ ∈ R(P ′).
At the same time, r ′(qi) = ri(qi) = r ′i (qi).
(⇐): Suppose that Q = {q1, . . . , qk}. Consider any r1, . . . , rk ∈ R(P ), and let r ′1, . . . , r ′k be their respective restrictions to
collaboration network NX . Since, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, run r ′i satisfies the local conditions of P ′ at any node of NX , we can
conclude that r ′1, . . . , r
′
k ∈ R(P ′). By the assumption thatP ′  [Q ∩E(NX )], there is a run r ′ ∈ R(P ′) such that r ′(q) = r ′i (q)
for any q ∈ Q ∩ E(NX ). In addition, r ′(q) = ε = r ′i (q) for any q ∈ Q\E(NX ). Hence, r ′(qi) = r ′i (qi) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Define run r as follows:
r(c) =

r ′(c) if c ∈ Ch(NX ),
ε if c /∈ Ch(NX ).
Note that r satisfies the local conditions of P at all nodes. Thus, r ∈ R(P ). In addition, r(qi) = r ′(qi) = r ′i (qi) for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. 
Wewill now prove another key theorem in our construction. The proof of this theorem recursively defines a generaliza-
tion of the parity protocol.
Theorem 16. For any sets A, B1, . . . , Bn ⊆ Ch(N), if N 0 1≤i≤n[Bi] → [A], then there is a finite protocol P over N such that
P  [Bi] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and P 2 [A].
Proof. We use induction on the number of parties in collaboration network N .
Case 1. If |A| ≤ 1, then, by the Small Set axiom, N ⊢ [A]. Hence,
N ⊢

1≤i≤n
[Bi] → [A],
which is a contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose that the channels of collaboration network N can be partitioned into two nontrivial disconnected sets X and
Y . That is, no channel in X is incident with a channel in Y . Thus, the empty set is a gateway between A∩ X and A∩ Y . By the
Gateway axiom,
N ⊢ [A ∩ X] → ([A ∩ Y ] → [A]).
Hence, taking into account the assumption that N 0

1≤i≤n[Bi] → [A], either
N 0

1≤i≤n
[Bi] → [A ∩ X]
or
N 0

1≤i≤n
[Bi] → [A ∩ Y ].
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Without loss of generality, we will assume the former. By Theorem 4,
N 0

1≤i≤n
[Bi ∩ X] → [A ∩ X].
By the Small Set axiom,
N 0 [∅] →
 
1≤i≤n
[Bi ∩ X] → [A ∩ X]

.
Consider the sets PX and PY of all parties in components X and Y , respectively. Note that (PX , PY ) is a cut of N that has no
crossing channels. Let NX be the result of the truncation of N along this cut. By the Truncation rule,
NX 0

1≤i≤n
[Bi ∩ X] → [A ∩ X].
By the Induction Hypothesis, there is a protocolP ′ on NX such thatP ′ 2 [A∩ X] andP ′  [Bi ∩ X], for any i ≤ n. Therefore,
by Theorem 15, there is a protocol P on N such that P 2 [A] and P  [Bi] for any i ≤ n.
Case 3. Suppose that there is i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that, if all channels in Bi0 are removed from collaboration network N ,
then at least one connected component of the resulting network N ′ does not contain an element of A. We will denote this
connected component by Q . Recall that E(Q ) denotes the set of all channels in N that begin and end in Q . Let Out(Q ) be
the set of channels in N that connect a party from Q with a party not in Q . Any path connecting a channel in E(Q ) with a
channel not in E(Q ) will have to contain a channel from Out(Q ). In other words, Out(Q ) is a gateway between E(Q ) and
the complement of E(Q ) in N . Hence, Out(Q ) is also a gateway between A ∩ E(Q ) and A \ E(Q ). Therefore, by the Gateway
axiom, taking into account that (A ∩ E(Q )) ∩ Out(Q ) ⊆ E(Q ) ∩ Out(Q ) = ∅,
N ⊢ [A ∩ E(Q ),Out(Q )] → ([A \ E(Q )] → [A]). (4)
Recall now that, by the assumption of this case, component Q of collaboration network N ′ does not contain any elements of
A. Hence, A ∩ E(Q ) ⊆ Bi0 . At the same time, Out(Q ) ⊆ Bi0 by the definition of Q . Thus, from statement (4) and Theorem 4,
N ⊢ [Bi0 ] → ([A \ E(Q ))] → [A]). (5)
By the assumption of the theorem,
N 0

1≤i≤n
[Bi] → [A]. (6)
From statements (5) and (6),
N 0

1≤i≤n
[Bi] → [A \ E(Q ))].
By the laws of propositional logic,
N 0 [Bi0 ] →
 
1≤i≤n
[Bi] → [A \ E(Q )]

.
Note that, ifQ is the complement of setQ , then (Q ,Q ) is a cut of collaboration networkN andOut(Q ) is the set of all crossing
channels of this cut. Since Q is a separate component in N ′, we have Out(Q ) ⊆ Bi0 . Thus, by Theorem 4,
N 0 [Out(Q )] →
 
1≤i≤n
[Bi] → [A \ E(Q )]

.
Again by Theorem 4,
N 0 [Out(Q )] →
 
1≤i≤n
[Bi \ E(Q )] → [A \ E(Q )]

.
Let NQ be the result of the truncation of network N along the cut (Q ,Q ). By the Truncation rule,
NQ 0

1≤i≤n
[Bi \ E(Q )] → [A \ E(Q )].
By the Induction Hypothesis, there is a protocol P ′ on NQ such that P ′ 2 [A \ E(Q )] and P ′  [Bi \ E(Q )] for any i ≤ n.
Therefore, by Theorem 15, there is a protocol P on N such that P 2 [A] and P  [Bi] for any i ≤ n.
Case 4. Assume now that (i) |A| > 1, (ii) collaboration network N is connected, and (iii) collaboration network N ′ is the
network obtained from N by the removal of all channels in Bi and, for any i ≤ n, each connected component of N ′ contains
at least one element of A. Consider the parity protocol PA over N . By Theorem 13, PA 2 [A]. By Theorem 14, PA  [Bi] for
any i ≤ n. 
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8.3. Protocol composition
In the previous section, we defined protocolPA. In this section, we begin by defining the composition of several protocols.
Later, we use this operation to combine protocolsPA for different values of A into a single protocol in order to finish the proof
of the completeness theorem.
Definition 11. For any protocolsP 1 = (V 1, L1), . . . ,P n = (V n, Ln) over a collaboration networkN , we define the Cartesian
composition P 1 × P 2 × · · · × P n to be a pair (V , L) such that
1. V (c) = V 1(c)× · · · × V n(c),
2. Lp(⟨c11 , . . . , cn1 ⟩, . . . , ⟨c1k , . . . , cnk ⟩) =

1≤i≤n Lip(c
i
1, . . . , c
i
k).
For each compositionP = P 1×P 2× · · · ×P n, we let {r(c)}i denote the ith component of the value of secret c over run r .
Theorem 17. For any n > 0 and any finite protocols P 1, . . . ,P n over a collaboration network N, P = P 1 × P 2 × · · · × P n
is a finite protocol over N.
Proof. We need to show that P has at least one run. Indeed, let r1, . . . , rn be runs of P 1, . . . ,P n. Define r(c) to be
⟨r1(c), . . . , rn(c)⟩. It is easy to see that r satisfies the local conditions Lp for any party p of network N . Thus, r ∈ R(P ). 
Theorem 18. For any n > 0, for any protocol P = P 1 × P 2 × · · · × P n over a collaboration network N, and for any set of
channels Q ,
P  [Q ] if and only if ∀i(P i  [Q ]).
Proof. Let Q = {q1, . . . , qℓ}.
(⇒): Assume that P  [Q ], and pick any i0 ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We will show that P i0  [Q ]. Pick any runs r ′1, . . . , r ′ℓ ∈ R(P i0).
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , i0 − 1, i0 + 1, . . . , n}, select an arbitrary run r i ∈ R(P i). We then define a series of composed runs rj
for j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} by
rj(c) = ⟨r1(c), . . . , r i0−1(c), r ′j (c), r i0+1(c), . . . , rn(c)⟩,
for each secret c ∈ Ch(N). Since the component parts of each rj belong in their respective sets R(P i), the composed runs
are themselves members of R(P ). By our assumption, P  [Q ]; thus there is r ∈ R(P ) such that r(qi) = ri(qi) for any
i0 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Finally, we consider the run r∗, where r∗(c) = {r(c)}i0 for each c ∈ Ch(N). That is, we let the value of r∗ on c
be the ioth component of r(c). By the definition of composition, r∗ ∈ R(P i0), and itmatches the original r ′1, . . . , r ′ℓ ∈ R(P i0)
on channels q1, . . . , qℓ, respectively. Hence, we have shown that P i0  [Q ].
(⇐): Assume that ∀i (P i  [Q ]). We will show thatP  [Q ]. Pick any runs r1, . . . , rℓ ∈ R(P ). For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, each
j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, and each channel c , let r ij (c) = {rj(c)}i. That is, for each c , define a run r ij whose value on channel c equals the
ith component of rj(c). Note that, by the definition of composition, for each i and each j, r ij is a run inR(P
i). Next, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we use the fact that P i  [Q ] to construct a run r i ∈ R(P i) such that r i(qj) = r ij (qj). Finally, we compose
these n runs r1, . . . , rn to get run r ∈ R(P ). We note that the value of each channel qj on r matches the value of qj in run
rj ∈ R(P ), demonstrating that P  [Q ]. 
We are now ready to prove the completeness theorem, which appeared earlier as Theorem 8.
Theorem. For any collaboration network N, if P  φ for all finite protocols P over N, then N ⊢ φ.
Proof. We give a proof by contradiction. Let X be a maximal consistent set of formulas from Φ(N) that contains ¬φ. Let
{A1, . . . , An} = {A ⊆ Ch(N) | N 0 [A]} and {B1, . . . , Bk} = {B ⊆ Ch(N) | N ⊢ [B]}. Thus, N 0 1≤j≤k[Bj] → [Ai], for any
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We will construct a protocol P such that P 2 [Ai] for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and P  [Bj] for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
First, consider the case where n = 0. Pick any symbol ϵ, and defineP to be ⟨V , L⟩ such that V (c) = {ϵ} for any c ∈ Ch(N)
and local condition Lp to be the constant True at any party p. By Definition 4, P  [C] for any C ⊆ Ch(N).
We will assume now that n > 0. By Theorem 16, there are finite protocols P 1, . . . ,P n such that P i 2 [Ai] and P i  [Bj]
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Consider the composition P of protocols P 1, . . . ,P n. By Theorem 18, P 2 [Ai] for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
and P  [Bj] for any j ∈ {1, . . . , j}.
By induction on the structural complexity of any formulaψ ∈ Φ(N), one can show now that N ⊢ ψ if and only ifψ ∈ X .
Thus, P  ¬φ. Therefore, P 2 φ, which is a contradiction. 
Corollary 1. The set {(N, φ) | N ⊢ φ} is decidable.
Proof. The complement of this set is recursively enumerable due to the completeness of the system with respect to finite
protocols. 
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9. Conclusions
We have presented a formal logical system for reasoning about an independence relation and proved the completeness
of this system with respect to a semantics of secrets. As an extension, one could study a natural generalization of this result
to secrets shared by more than two parties. In that setting, a collaboration network is a hypergraph whose edges (channels)
may connect an arbitrary number of nodes (parties).
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